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Towards an Account of Argumentation in Science
MARK WEINSTEIN
Institute for Critical Thinking
MontclairState College
Upper Montclair,NJ 07043, U.S.A.

ABSTRACT: In this article it is argued that a complex model that includes Toulmin's
functional account of argument, the pragma-dialectical stage analysis of argumentation
offered by the Amsterdam School, and criteria developed in critical thinking theory, can be
used to account for the normativity and field-dependence of argumentation in science. A
pragma-dialectical interpretation of the four main elements of Toulmin's model, and a
revised account of the double role of warrants, illuminates the domain specificity of
scientific argumentation and the restrictions to which the confrontation and opening stages
of scientific critical discussions are subjected. In regard to the argumentation stage,
examples are given to show that a general account of argumentation, as advocated by
informal logicians, is not applicable to arguments in science. Furthermore, although
patterns of inference differ in various scientific practices, deductive validity is argued to be
a crucial notion in the assessment of scientific arguments. Finally, some remarks are made
concerning the burden of proof and the concluding stage of scientific argumentation.
KEY WORDS: Argumentation, science, Stephen Toulmin, pragma-dialectical theory
of argumentation, field-dependency, stage analysis, relevance, generalization, deductive
validity.

This paper is part of a philosophical project directed towards an account
of the normative aspects of arguments in science. In it I will attempt a
number of tasks. The first is to disentangle normative elements from
complexes of considerations generally seen as sociological.' To do this I
will draw from a variety of approaches relevant to argumentation in
science. I will rely heavily on the work of Stephen Toulmin, the pragmadialectical approach of the Amsterdam School, and recent work in critical
thinking theory at Montclair State College. This will, hopefully, show the
utility of combining the work of the Amsterdam School with Toulmin's
basic model as a framework for understanding scientific argument, and
permit a rehabilitation of Toulmin in the eyes of his critics within argumentation theory. Next, I will offer a framework for argument analysis that
takes particular practices in the various fields of inquiry as essential. This
is of particular concern to informal logic, which generally sees argument
analysis as indifferent to disciplinary particulars, and offers instead,
abstract and topic-neutral accounts of logic and methodology. Discussions
of a few central concepts in the informal logic of argumentation are
offered in order to support my contentions. I then include a discussion of
Argumentation 4: 269-298, 1990.
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the notion of validity and attempt to offer an outline of an account of the
various roles deductive validity plays in scientific argument. My concern is
with, what might be called, "stylized" arguments in special disciplines, that
is, argument that is based upon particular principles and practices learned
and applied by members of specific argumentation communities. There is
an underlying commitment to a view that sees such stylized argumentation
as salient to the theory of argumentation. This includes the controversial
position that ordinary argumentation might be better understood if argument analysis were seen in terms of argumentation in particular professional disciplines, and if a paradigm for argument analysis based on
argument in specific domains was better articulated and more widely used.
This last point has consequences for the teaching of argumentation,
informal logic and critical thinking, especially at the undergraduate level.
These last concerns surface in a number of places in the paper without
being a major focus of the discussion.
My extensive use of the stage analysis of argument, offered by van
Eemeren and Grootendorst in the theoretical estate in conjunction with
Toulmin's functional analysis of argument requires some preliminary
words.2 The presentation of Toulmin's work, by van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Kruiger in the Handbook of Argumentation Theory,3 although
sympathetic, criticizes Toulmin on a number of counts. A central objection is that Toulmin's "terminology is sometimes rather vague and obscure,
and on some points even inconsistent." 4 This, they claim, is especially true
of his use of the term "valid." This is an important criticism of the position
as Toulmin states it, but in itself may not endanger the insights that the
position affords. In the following I will use "valid" in the strict logical sense
and designate non-logical approval through terms such as "acceptable." If
Toulmin's position can be reconstructed using "valid" in a strict and
limited sense, we will claim that, at least in this regard, the criticism is met.
A similar, and perhaps more serious criticism involves the notion of
warrant. Many of Toulmin's critics have found this concept hopelessly
vague, and have used its unclarity as a justification for rejecting the claim
to domain specificity that is at the heart of Toulmin's model.5 Here the
going is more difficult. What I will argue is that although warrants are
difficult to identify without ambiguity, in the examples that Toulmin offers,
the notion is sound. This will be argued for on two grounds. The first is to
accept a criticism cited in the Handbook and attributed to Manicas and
Trent, 6 and through this criticism, to offer a significant reconceptualization
of warrants. The second, is to argue that although warrants may be hard to
identify in short samples of expository argumentative prose, a pragmadialectical reconstruction of the notion of warrant solves the problem of
ambiguity by relating warrants to responses to particular kinds of challenges. This will take us far in the direction required to explicate a notion
of field dependency that seems to capture key aspects of scientific argu-
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mentation. Although the notion of field dependency may not be obviously
relevant to argument in ordinary discourse, it is my intuition that an
adequate analysis of argument in science will shed light on aspects of
many, if not all, arguments in ordinary life.7
One more preliminary is required before we can begin the analysis of
argumentation in science, that is my conception of Toulmin's theory of
scientific argument. Toulmin's position, as I conceive it, is best understood
if we take as central the historical reconstruction of significant epistemological and metaphysical junctures in the history of various sciences that
he provides in his work with June Goodfield.8 It is this Toulmin that
stands behind my understanding of his theory of reason and argument, not
the self-avowed jurisprudentialist of An Introduction to Reasoning.9
Toulmin, in the historical works, sees pattern in actual scientific discourse
that can be identified and theoritized in order to offer a normative
construction relevant to the analysis and assessment of scientific arguments. We now turn to the analysis of scientific argument.

1. THE STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENTATION IN SCIENCE

I could maintain that almost all of science includes argumentation, at least
in the sense that problems are at the core of most scientific work. Thus,
any problem response is within a context of uncertainty, whence constitutes argumentation in the sense of the Amsterdam School. Further,
given the central role of falsifiability in science, scientific claims are
scrutinized as a matter of course, replications are attempted, protocols are
carefully examined, and the like. But, even if such a broad construal of
scientific discourse is not accepted, much of science includes explicit
argumentation. Claims are frequently challenged and discussions pro and
con continue for extended periods of time in the scientific literature. In the
following, I will assume that argumentation in science occurs in the
technical sense of the Amsterdam School, that is, that a claim is put
forward that is doubtful. As often as not, an argument arises when a claim
is challenged and so the antagonist is asserting some denial of the claim at
some particular level of modality." Even if argumentation is limited to a
subset of scientific claims put forward, some analysis of such arguments is
required. Such a limiting assumption does not seem to alter the structure
that I will attempt to illuminate. What is important to the task of integrating Toulmin's model within a pragma-dialectical framework is the
various sorts of constraints placed on challenges that occur within scientific discourse, as well as the specific complexities that become apparent
when scientific arguments are looked at through the theory of argument
stages offered by the Amsterdam School.
Argumentation in science, when it occurs, occurs within a stylized
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complex of practices and within a complex network of previous commitments, both propositional and dialogical in the broadest sense possible.
Even practices that are non-verbal are dialogical in the sense that they are
performed with an eye to the ongoing correction of the practices of other
scientists." Most claims, and therefore many of those that lead to argument, are responses to problem situations that are relatively well known to
members of the domain in which the claims are made.' 2 The claim is thus
addressed to individuals in a privileged dialogical position, individuals
who share a commitment to a practice of inquiry and to many propositions that express claims already accepted in the field. For a scientific
claim to be seriously advanced it must fit into a framework within which
the claim is to be validated and argumentation advanced and assessed.
The social and professional background of scientific argument requires
that the conditions for argument be more complex than those in ordinary
life. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have articulated, a four-tier structure
of conditions relevant to the "rules of conduct" for critical discussions.' 3
The first order conditions are the rules for argument as articulated, for
example, in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discourse. The second order
conditions have to do with "internal characteristics" of the protaganist, for
example, "that a person is actually willing to advance arguments for his
viewpoint."' 4 Third order conditions are "external requirements concerning the circumstances in which the discussion takes place." They offer as
an instance of such requirements, that the protagonist "has a real voice on
the subject and is not, for example, totally dependent on the compassion
of the person whom he is addressing."' These third order conditions
concern "social, economical and political circumstances." 6 Fourth order
conditions are, roughly, biological.
Third order conditions are paramount in science.' 7 They are reflected
in social and professional structures that determine the very possibility of
significant scientific argument. Many of the third order conditions are
external controls that help to guarantee that second order conditions are
satisfied as well, second order conditions construed here as mental (intentional), that is having to do with the cognitive competence or dispositions
of the protagonist. Most fundamentally, significant scientific argument
requires that various third order conditions on the situatedness of the
protaganist be satisfied. The protaganist must, generally speaking, be a
bona fide member of the field, and must show evidence of understanding
the problem situation to which the argument is addressed, through the
style of his argumentation and the content of his claim. This last, is a
second order mental condition governed by the externalization of knowledge and competence through objective canons for the presentation of
claims, usually requiring the satisfaction of third order conditions such as
the availability of the means to do research, to construct and publish
reports, etc. The protagonist must satisfy various constraints on how
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arguments are framed and related to previous work in the field. For the
most part, these constraints are governed by a public process of review
that is typified by the practices of editorial boards of journals in the field.
Although such practices are socially constituted, when they function
properly they are based on objective and defensible procedures for "gatekeeping," procedures that are tacitly accepted by members of the field and
required to limit the content of argumentation to positions that are
professionally acceptable and relevant to the problem situation in the field
at a time.
As just stated, although second order conditions must be satisfied, third
order conditions are generally used to sustain the second order ones. This
is not always successful as evidenced by the notorious case of Cyril Burt,
who although satisfying all of the third order conditions, being a respected
member of the field, presenting work within existing protocols and
publishing in respected journals, failed to be sincere in his data collection
and presentation." This gives us direction in clarifying the relationship of
an essential fallacy to scientific argument. The entire structure that governs
the presentation of claims in respected organs of dissemination is based on
institutionalized authority. Fallacious appeals to authority, thus, include
the assessment of claims and arguments based primarily on the protagonists position of the field, and in a fashion that is indifferent to methodological standards and background knowledge, frequently including
knowledge of alternative or incompatible positions.
Notice that the social structure of science tends to conservatism, thus
alternatives are deemed significant only if they themselves have met the
test of disciplinary appropriateness. This is a block to criticism but,
arguably, supports rational argument most of the time by limiting the
range of alternatives against which claims have to be considered. Naturally, there are local infelicities, as when a new view is disregarded, but yet
such socially mediated conservatism may prove useful in the long run. An
epistemological justification of gate-keeping procedures would have to
show that such conservatism is a good general policy even though it has its
costs.
The social construction of forums that determine acceptable argument
give us the first sense of relevance in scientific arguments: a scientific
argument is relevant, in the sense of worthy of consideration, based on a
reasoned judgment made in respect of the protagonists position in the
field and the appropriateness of arguments presented, given accepted
standards of professional practice." This has a clear analogy with the
"recognizability condition."2 0 A scientist who puts forward a claim, if it is
to be seriously considered, must do so in a fashion that meets the
expectation in a field for appropriate endeavors. Judgments of relevance
are, as just stated, generally socially constituted in the form of journal
editors and their staffs, who will only consider submissions that are in
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standard form for the field. Institutionalized procedures may even include
such seemingly pure sociological conditions as institutional affiliations. But
even such apparently social constraints can be seen to have a logical
(methodological) core, for institutions have standing as initial arbiters of
scientific adequacy. That is, prima facie, a scientist writing on the stationery of a major research university will have shown competence in the
basic protocols of scientific practice in order to have achieved a position
that entitles him to present his views under the aegis of his institution.
Thus, his work is shown to be, prima facie, relevant to the ongoing debate
in the field in terms of his recognized status and style of his contribution
as determined by authority wielding social institutions.
Further conditions analogous to correctness conditions must be satisfied
as well. It is interesting to note in this regard, that in institutionalized
science judgments as to correctness are made by declaratives, usually
judgments of referees in journals, although it is expected that these
declaratives are based on criteria appropriate to the field. This is a
particularly striking difference between the speech act analysis of argumentation in science and those of ordinary life. Like the law, scientific
discourse has a place for declaratives, as well as for the other speech acts:
assertives, directives and commissives. Such declaratives are not arbitrary,
rather, they are based on underlying methodological and epistemological
considerations. The standing of journal referees is generally determined by
their ability to issue declaratives of correctness that are, for the most part,
defensible in the light of consideration by members of the field, who are
the ultimate arbiters of a journal's standing. Journals that publish inadequate papers or who demonstrate lack of judgment by rejecting major
works that are published elsewhere, quickly lose their standing in the field.
What has been said so far, involves the confrontation stage of argument.
Not only are there severe restrictions, contrary to those found in ordinary
argumentation, as to what can be significantly put forward as a scientific
claim, but, as should be clear from the discussion so far, the confrontation
stage in scientific argument presupposes that much of the opening stage is
in place. For a claim to be seriously seen as worthy of significant doubt, it
must satisfy much of the framework within which it is to be considered.2
Such a framework determines the sorts of problems to be considered, the
sorts of data (and data gathering procedures) to be put forward, the
generalizations to be appealed to, and the general methodological principles reflected by the problem addressed, the data generated, and the
generalizations employed. That is not to say that any of these elements
necessarily remain unchallenged, it is rather to say that in the normal
course of scientific argument such a framework exists and structures the
presentation of claims and subsequent argumentation.
Before we can extend our analysis further, we must bring in the work of
Toulmin, for as I will attempt to show, Toulmin's model is necessary if we
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are to see the complexity of the rules to be adhered to in the opening stage
and thus, be able to analyze, and ultimately assess, the argument schemes
put forward in the argumentation and concluding stages.

2. THE WORK OF STEPHEN TOULMIN

We first must attempt the rehabilitation of Toulmin in light of the criticism
leveled at his work by both informal logicians and argumentation theorists. 22 In order to do this, we must make explicit a pragma-dialectical
version of his model of argument. The key to a pragma-dialectical interpretation of Toulmin is to see that the four main elements that he
identifies, claim, ground, warrant and backing, are never inherently
identifiable in and of themselves, and thus, the model he offers is extremely difficult to apply to propositions, or even small sets of propositions, taken out of the context of argumentation. Even though there are
paradigmatic instances of the four types and some heuristics available for
categorizing propositions into the four kinds, it is not the logical form or
the content of propositions that furnish the criteria for their identification.
Rather, the kinds Toulmin identifies constitute functional categories and
take their category as the result of dialectical moves within argumentation,
whether tacit or explicit.2 3 So, generally speaking, claims occur as particular responses to scientific problem contexts, and are identified by
theses put forward as putative solutions in respect of particular issues.
Questions as to the relevance of claims require warrants, and questions as
to the appropriateness of warrants put forward to support the relevance of
grounds for claims require backing. This is the second sense of relevance
in science: relevance of the grounds put forward in light of explicit or
implicit warrants.
The foregoing is a first approximation. The situation is more complex
than that, for as Grootendorst and van Eemeren point out, there are at
least two senses of warrant possible in particular cases: the warrant of the
grounds, as grounds for claims (relevance), and the warrant of the grounds
themselves in terms of methodological appropriateness (facticity). 24 25
Take as a paradigmatic example of grounds, grounds supporting an initial
claim that requires relatively low level data, the results of experiment
perhaps, or of sampling in the social sciences. Questions as to the
relevance of the grounds for the claim, in terms of the generalizations
(covering laws) within which the data is to be applied, do not exhaust
possible challenges to the data. Data may be relevant in the sense of being
possible instances of an accepted generalization in a field, but might still
be suspect in a variety of ways. Typically, the data may not have been
generated in ways that are acceptable, perhaps in light of generalizations
that govern the instrumentation in the experimental design, or in light of
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acceptable sampling procedures in the field. Such challenges require
warrants to be offered in response to the challenge, but here the warrant
contributes not to the relevance of the data, but to its facticity. Claims
supported by data, demand empirical information that is both relevant in
terms of generalizations in the field and that also satisfies the constraints
upon empirical information of specific kinds.
The double role of warrants, addressing both the relevance of the data
and its facticity, does not weaken Toulmin's model, nor does it alter the
model's pragmatic and dialectical structure. Both sorts of demands are
common in scientific claims and generate scientific argumentation. Both
respond to the common set of generalizations accepted by members in the
field, although, as stated, these generalizations are of at least two different
sorts. Both of these kinds of warrants, however, are put forward in
response to the requirements placed upon scientists demanding that they
satisfy canons of reliability governing the methods used and the problem
solutions put forward. Both kinds of warrants, when challenged, require
that backing be offered, although these are of various sorts, corresponding
to the kinds of warrants put forward: theoretical generalizations to support
the relevance of grounds for claims, and methodological canons for
validating the facticity of empirical data.
This can be most easily seen when the theory that warrants the facticity
of the data is different from that which supports generalizations that the
data are instances of. An obvious example is claims in microbiology,
where the theory that marks the relevance of the information applied to
macro-biological problems is, perhaps, some version of cell theory, or
aspects of organic chemistry, while the theories that govern data collection
include optics and the chemistry of stains. Take as a topical example, the
recent claim to fusion at low temperatures. Many of the complaints
physicists have lodged against the claims of Pons and Fleischmann are
based on their possibly erroneous measurement of heat, due to problems
in their experimental design, while others are based upon the incompatibility of their data with higher order physical principles that place
limits on possible energy outputs of fusion reactions. This is a particularly
interesting case since it raises a third issue, that is, the failure of the
experimenters to satisfy conventions for reporting their experimental
work. These conventions are attempts to guarantee careful scrutiny of
experiments by the relevant scientific community. The justifications (warrants and backing) offered by Pons and Fleischmann in regard to such
challenges are not purely scientific in nature, but rather address concerns
in the sociology and economics of scientific practice in light of the
enormous social and financial implications of their work.26
Notice, the theories that determine the relevance of data need not be
distinct from those that warrant their facticity. So, many generalizations
are themselves part of a methodological framework relevant to the
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assessement of empirical claims in both respects. Rigid body mechanics
covers both the rulers and the things measured. Electrostatics grounds
both the instruments that measure electrical properties, and furnishes the
mathematical theories by which data is shown relevant to dynamical
problems in the study of electrical phenomena. For another example of
theoretic warrants that support both relevance and facticity, take the
mathematics of bell curves which determine much of the predictive force
of sampling in large populations, and also governs the motion of a random
sample required to validate the sampling procedures used to furnish data
to be applied through statistical laws that play a predictive or explanatory
role.
Conditions of the sort outlined, whether tacit or explicit, are characteristic of the issues involved in the confrontation stage. As in all argumentation, the rules agreed to in the opening stage structure the argumentation itself. As a dialectical model requires, the argumentation is the
result of claim and challenge. As we have attempted to show, the data in
support of a claim may be challenged in two ways, first, as to their
relevance in light of accepted generalizations in the field, and second, in
terms of the procedures that govern the facticity of the data. If the data is
acceptable, that is satisfies methodological constraints, the first level of
challenge is to the relevance of the data to the claim for which the data is
presented as evidence. Data, as in Toulmin's view, must be linked to the
claim through acceptable general statements. This is not as easy as it
seems. Simple logical devices, the most notorious asserting the conditional
consisting of data and claim, will not do.2 7
Generalizations in science are pre-conditions for the relevance of data
and so they can not be constructed ad hoc. But there are problems here as
well. As Cartwright has shown in How the Laws of Physics Lie, the array
of available generalizations does not uniquely determine which generalizations may be cited in support of the relevance of data, at least if we take
laser optics (her example) as characteristic. 2 8 On her account, researchers
can choose between a variety of alternative generalizations, and do so
for, among other reasons, pragmatic efficiency. How this relates to the
epistemological ideal of a uniquely true set of general descriptors of a
domain remains to be seen. Notice, this is not only true in cutting edge
fields, recent discussions of the use of Hamiltonians to determine orbits
shows that even in as stable fields as astronomy, data may not be
warranted by a unique set of generalizations. 2 9
The issue is even more complex when the claim is not about the
relevance of a data set to a problem, but is instead, a claim to a new
generalization put forward on the basis of evidence. The pragma-dialectical insight that no proposition is inherently a ground as opposed to a
warrant forces us to deal with claims at all levels of generality. How then
are such generalizations supported? The situation is complex since, as is
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usually maintained, generalizations may be constructed inductively as ways
of covering newly discovered relationships between data sets. Thus, the
data are not supported by the generalizations but rather, the generalization
is argued for by appeal to newly discovered empirical relationships. This,
although seemingly inconsistent with Toulmin, is readily handled by his
model.3 0 Once we realize that the role of ground and warrant is functional,
there is no problem in warranting a generalization through empirical data.
Naturally, what is required is backing. In such cases, the issue is to show
that methodological practice justifies the use of such empirical relationships as appropriate grounds for generalizations of the sort put forward.
This may involve furnishing well-supported generalizations governing
procedures of the sort employed, generalizations about the domain
explored, its properties and relations, as well as of the instrumentation
used. But there is more to the issue, for the generalization can frequently
be warranted through its systematic relationships to other generalizations
(theoretic explanation or reduction), or by analogy to similar kinds of
generalizations supported by similar data sets (theoretic analogy). 3 ' Both
of these moves require backing, if they are challenged. But there is no
problem in principle. The level of generality of an assertion does not
determine whether or not warrants and backing are needed, rather it
determines the sort of support required. Even the most abstract methodological claims require warrants and even backing.
What I have been trying to show is that during the argument stage,
relevance is determined by appeal to principles accepted in the field, or if
the claim upon which argumentation is focused includes appeals to extrafield considerations or is itself, a call for alternatives to the field's theoretic
or methodological assumptions, relevance is a function of the availability
of convincing analogues drawn from other areas of successful human
inquiry. Toulmin's work in Human Understanding begins the task of
exploring where warrants and backing for the most abstract claims is to be
sought. 32 My intuition is that his analysis in basically sound, that the most
abstract principles in a field can only be warranted by analogy with work
in other areas, frequently, but not exclusively, philosophy. Such a claim
can only be supported by looking at actual historical disputes at the
highest level of abstraction, a task Toulmin accomplishes in the historical
works cited and argues in more general terms in Human Understanding.
An interesting example of such abstract argumentation in science is that
of Galileo's arguments for the new dynamics in the Two Chief World
Systems. Feyerabend, in Against Method, offers an account of Galileo that
portrays him as a public relations expert, convincing his contemporaries
that they really have always seen the world in the radically new ways that
he proposes.3 3 On a view such as Toulmin's this need not be seen as a
public relations trick, but may represent a philosophical appeal, perhaps in
the style of Wittgenstein, that points to experiences missed through prior
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theoretical commitment. Contra Feyerabend, I would claim that Galileo
need not be judged to be a hoaxter up to his tricks. Galileo must employ
the most abstract arguments to warrant his new methodological principles,
just because the claims that he is making are so radical and fundamental to
the new science of dynamics that he is trying to construct. Needless to say,
the correctness of Toulmin's account in Human Understanding can only
be supported by an epistemological theory adequate to actual scientific
practice. What interests me about Toulmin is that he gives the beginning
of such a theory. That is, if you follow me in taking Human Understanding
in combination with the historical work that, for me, is the real core of
Toulmin's position.
An argument in support of the relevance of domain specific considerations and actual practice to argument analysis and assessment, must
include more of the structure of argumentation than aspects of the
surrounding context relevant to the opening and confrontation stage of
argument, for these are unsurprisingly context sensitive. In particular, it
must show how the internal structure of argumentation requires domain
specific considerations. To do this we must deal more directly with the
argument stage and with informal logic. The task is to show the insufficiency of informal logic, as currently conceived, to the task of analyzing
and assessing argumentation in science. In the following we will use, as an
example, causal arguments and the related notions of sample and observation. We will then turn to the notion of validity, and finally return to
general considerations of argument analysis, focusing on burden of proof,
especially as relevant to the concluding stage of argument.

3. INFORMAL LOGIC AND SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENTATION

It is within the argument stage that informal logic should have the most to
say about the structure and assessment of scientific argumentation. What I
will claim is that informal logic as currently conceived, limited for the
most part to argument diagramming and a theory of fallacies that sees
them as undifferentiated in relation to their context of application, has
failed to offer a unifying vision sufficient for the assessment of the core of
argumentation. 3 4 Even if insufficient as currently conceived, informal logic
yields a rich variety of clues relevant to argument analysis and assessment
in science, both through the identification of particular fallacies, which I
maintain are best conceptualized as denoting families of related considerations, and through the analysis of the structure of argument. What is
peculiar to my position, is that I see such clues as useful only if informal
logic and the analyses it affords, is strengthened to include an account
of field specific concerns. The difficulty, as I see it, is the self-imposed
universalism that appears to underlie accounts of fallacies and structural
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relations found in informal texts and theory. Why this creates a difficulty is
best shown by examples. But first a word about an underlying theory.
Informal logic, on my view, requires a richer sensitivity to the practice
in various fields of intellectual endeavor. That, however, does not preclude
the utility of a general account, if the general account uncovers rather than
obscures significant aspects of particular practices. Thus, I maintain, that
what a general account must offer is a probe into the particulars of
arguments in various domains. With such a probe, the relevance of the
apparatus of informal logic as indicators of kinds of considerations,
exposes those key elements, that when differentiated, enable us to say
something useful about arguments in particular domains of inquiry.
For me that most helpful insight comes from critical thinking theory,
and in particular, the work at the Institute for Critical Thinking at
Montclair State College in New Jersey. We have taken as our focus an
analysis of critical thinking offered by our colleague Matthew Lipman.35
Lipman's work offers a probe into actual argumentation that points both
to the relevance of aspects of the specifics of the field within which
argumentation is housed, and to an essential role for the standard apparatus of fallacies and structural diagrams. We, at the Institute, take critical
thinking to be: skillful thinking that results in judgment, that is reliant on
criteria, is sensitive to context, and is self-correcting. This highly abstract
characterization falls midway between overarching conceptions of critical
thinking, such as Harvey Siegel's characterization of critical thinking as,
"being appropriately moved by reason", 3 6 and those that, like Robert
Ennis', are specified in terms of particular dispositions (traits of mind),
analytic skills, standard inference patterns and fallacies, 3 7 or notions, such
Richard Paul's, that offer complex molar "strategies". 3 8
For me, the core of Lipman's analysis is the concept of criteria as the
basis for judgment. What the analysis points to is the particulars of the
criterialogical considerations brought forward in order to support inferentially related activities. The analysis, however, begs no questions as to the
contour of the particulars. This is crucial, if as I shall maintain, the core
inferential items identified in typical informal logic texts are themselves
relevantly varied in logical and methodological structure, when they (or
more realistically, analogues of aspects of informal logic) are used in
argumentation in particular fields. Thus, no assessment of argument is
possible in the terms of the generic notions, whether fallacies or structural
accounts. Further, when fallacies are undifferentiated at to field specific
particulars, and when structure is identified as a level of abstraction that
excludes structural qualifiers such as those of Toulmin, or even more field
specific inferential apparatus, those aspects of the argumentation exhibited
are shown in a way that is open to both trivial and incorrect assessment,
and fosters a disregard for the more crucial elements presented as support
for claims. I will argue through examples.3
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Take as an example, a central concept in argumentation: causation.
Causation is very much at the center of argument analysis and informal
logic, and is generally seen as an essential part of scientific argument and
explanation. 411 As I hope to show, the stylized contexts of scientific
argument so deeply qualify the nature of causal arguments, that it seems
unlikely that a general account will afford much understanding of the role,
nature and assessment of causal claims. Similar analyses seem available for
other molar concepts such as inductive warrant, for general strategies such
as analysis, and for semantical concerns such as vagueness. I will offer an
analysis of causation as an example, including the related notions of
sample and observation. The example offered must stand for many other
possible analyses. My hope is that the obviousness of the position, as
exemplified by considering the practices in various domains, will suffice to
make the point.
Causal inference, explicitly stated, is frequently absent in scientific
accounts. 41 Classical Physics, upon which so much positivist and neopositivist philosophy of science relied, is typified by its use of the apparatus of differential equations and indeterministic statistics, rather than by
explicit causal statements. Key positivist theorists saw causal inference as
dependent upon more fundamental inferential structures. 4 2 Although
causality played a role in accounts of scientific argument, the image of
causality found in logic books was most frequently constructed from simple
examples in daily life, detective stories, or structurally simplified scientific
reasoning. 43 If we think of causation, in the most general sense, as reflecting the connection of an event (event type) with determining (even if
indeterministic) conditions (whether prior, contemporaneous, or possibly
future), we have a surrogate for causation that is general in respect of the
philosophical debate. 44 Such a broad and minimal structure permits us to
cast a wide net across diverse scientific practices that are causal in such a
broad sense.
To start with some familiar cases: Determining conditions in classical
physics are frequently expressed through differential equations; in contrast, psychological theory and practice employs standard statistics, construed as testing the improbability of a null hypothesis. The latter is
characteristic of the social sciences, and stands in contrast to chemistry
where causal arguments are based on laboratory experiments that reflect a
central concern with isolating elements through concrete procedures such
as the determination of mass, electric charge and the like. The supporting
theory is keyed to these procedures, and offers inference patterns specific
to the structure of chemical formula. Differences are apparent even in
closely related pairs. The formalism of chemical equations is so distinct
from the underlying physics that is ultimately seen as its theoretical
support, that the task of "reducing" chemistry to physics, in even so simple
a case as the reduction of the Boyle-Charles Law to statistical mechanics,
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requires complex and specific additional inferential apparatus, in the form
of statistical assumptions that determine (and limit the computability of)
derivations in actual applications.4 5 Even more removed is atomic theory
from its micro-theory. Quantum mechanical assumptions appear to render
the conjunction of quantum mechanics and physical chemistry inconsistent. Nevertheless these assumptions form the basic inferential structure
that governs explanations across the two domains. 4 6
Argumentation in an applied science, such as medicine, offers instances
of causal arguments that appear to have an easy fit with root philosophical
accounts. Hemple uses Semmelweis' work on childbed fever to exemplify
the deductive-nomological model.47 A rich presentation of Snow's work
on cholera is an effective text book case of Mill's methods offered by two
science educators. 4 8 Such textbook renderings, however, fall short of much
of medical argumentation. Modern medical science offers few detective
stories. When it does, the suspects are legion and varied, the methods of
analysis dependent on theory, and the patterns of inference are as diverse as
the statistical practice of epidemiologists, as contrasted with the typologies
and heuristics of clinicians, or the complex physical reconstructions based
on computer analysis and drawing heavily from physical theory, characteristic of CAT scans and the like. Even if aspects of medical argumentation can be captured by Mill's methods and other general accounts, much
else is highly qualified by practices specific to particular problems and the
underlying scientific understanding available to the medical scientist.
Moving further across domains in which causation plays a central role
in argumentation yields more characteristic types. Sociological and psychological accounts, the determination of economic trends, historical
narratives, and literary analyses all may involve explanations in terms of
intentions, and thus form a family of related arguments. But each discipline includes argument patterns that differentiate it from the others, and
many problems require the utilization of diverse argument strategies.
Patterns of difference extend to less global aspects of scientific reasoning. Take the notion of sample as related to generalization. We begin with
a science in which the concept finds an uncomfortable lodging at best. To
say that there are samples of such physical phenomena as inertial motion
is to speak oddly. In metallurgy, on the other hand, there are clearly
samples of elements, but these samples are treated in a fashion that belies
identification with sampling in quantitative sociology. Both of these are
clearly distinguished from sampling where one is attempting to determine
the ratio of chemically similar atoms. Even with the same focus for
inquiry, sampling differs. Compare sampling procedures in qualitative as
contrasted with those in quantitative sociology.
Each case requires different structuring of the sample from which
inferences are drawn. How odd to ask for the "reliability" of a sample of
lead (reliability as to what, as a piece of solder); yet, how natural to
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demand reliability for samples in educational psychology. Can we inquire
as to the "representativeness" of an instance of circular motion (representative of what?); the representativeness of a sample in a series of test
for AIDS, on the other hand, is natural, yet distinct, from the full-blooded
notion of representativeness in quantitative social science. Again, we see a
family of usages, related no doubt, but, if my intuition is correct, differing
in respect of crucial and substantive methodological principles that govern
their role in argumentation.
A related epistemological concept, crucial in scientific argument, is that
of observation. Again, we find a family of methods, associated with a
range of differing regards that reflect the criteria with which the observation base of scientific argument is assessed. The differences are obvious
enough. Take the following list: observing the occurence of a quantum
event within the context of "discovering" whether a theoretically predicted
elementary particle exists; observing the direction of motion by calculating
vectors using the parallelogram of forces; observing the density of a
sample by the use of a centrifuge; observation relevant to spectroscopic
analysis in order to determine the chemical composition of an unknown
substance; post mortem observations to support a diagnosis of Allzheimer's disease; using a CAT scan to observe a brain tumor; observing the
behavior of members of a group of teenagers within the context of urban
anthropology; observing an economic trend; observation reports of an
historical event; checking for observational accuracy in astronomy (think
of Percival Lowell, the leading astronomer of the early 20th century, who
published a large volume, including illustrations, to prove the existence of
the "canals" of Mars); making a visual check to determine why a car isn't
running; observing the topology of a geographic area in order to reconstruct its geologic history; observing through sonograms in order to
explore for oil. The family is connected to be sure, but where is the
unanimity of function and substance that is required to give an univocal
account of the assessment of observations as the basis for argumentation
in these instances? Each type construes the role of observation through
different procedures of data collection and inference, and so each type is
liable to its own budget of unhappinesses and felicities.
The current point of view sustained within informal logic sees continuity of concept underlying the traditional labels that mark central
concepts. I, on the other hand, see the concepts in informal logic as
"placemarkers" that serve a heuristic function by identifying families of
concerns, without yet touching a level of analysis sufficient for significant
assessment of argumentation in science. The examples above point to this
conclusion without exhausting available instances. Similar analyses could
do so as well. So, it seems to me, that such apparently logical elements as
begging the question are clearly context sensitive. Begging the question is
inherently pragmatic, and relative to those questions that are defined in
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the opening stage as the basis for confrontation, challenge and support.
Similarly, charges of non-sequitor are deeply reliant on contextual elements, inferential capabilities, specific patterns of acceptable argument
and underlying explanatory frameworks. All of these are deeply methodological, relative to practice in a field, and include essential reference to
the problem situation within which argumentation occurs.
My analysis, so far, goes against the grain of a deeply embedded
tendency in philosophy to search for general and topic-neutral analyses of
central logical and epistemological concepts. This is clearly evident in the
practice of philosophers of science in the positivist and neo-positivist
tradition who saw their task as defining univocal substitutes for complex
contextual aspects of arguments, using apparatus based on the formal logic
of entailments. The task of finding general accounts seems to remain at the
center of informal logic as well. In order to understand the difficulties and
possibilities of these approaches, let us turn to the crucial notion of
entailment.
The logic of entailment has a long and rich history, and has been at the
center of philosophical and practical logic for decades. Entailment, in any
broad sense, requires more than implication and presumably includes
accounts of such relevant aspects of logical argument as analytic and
nomic hypotheses. Both analytic and nomic statements are essential to
actual inference, since they express internal connection between terms that
are at the core of inference relations that are not explicitly truth functional. As just mentioned, formal logicians, earlier in the century, sought to
substitute univocal structures based on implication, for the rich and
confusing array of natural entailments. 4 9 Informal logicians have, generally,
eschewed such a course of action.5 0 Still, implication seems available as a
response to contextualized accounts of the sort put forward here. In
particular, the sorts of considerations I put forward would be seen as
superfluous, if some notion of deductive validity could be applied to
warrant inferences in scientific argument. For then, the specifics of the
internal structures of inferences would be reducible to a univocal account
in terms of well understood deductive operations. Various recommendations to treat deductive validity as central to the analysis of argument have
been met with charges of "deductive chauvinism." Yet deductivism remains attractive, if only because deductions abound in argument, either
explicitly or through readily available enthymatic reconstructions. We will
therefore turn to a discussion of the notion of validity.

4. VALIDITY
The notion of deductive validity is crucial in the assessment of arguments,
at least if we mean the basic apparatus, modes ponens, modes tollens,
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principles of substitution, generalization and the like. For all arguments,
whether inductive, analogical or whatever, require that premises be presented and that conclusions be supported. Whence conditionalization is
guaranteed, and so is detachment, whether in the name of asserting the
conclusion or denying the conjoined premises, in any system of inference
for which the deduction theorem can be proved.5 1 It is the deduction
theorem that seems to lie behind the insight that maintains the trivial
deductivization of arguments by including the minimal conditional as a
missing premise.5 2 The correctness of such a position requires, so it seems,
that the deduction theorem be provable for the natural or stylized
language within which argumentation occurs. Such an assumption seems to
be taken as obvious by much of the discussion on the deductive validity of
ordinary or stylized arguments. We might conjecture, given the reliance of
standard proofs of the deduction theorem on a clear, albeit controversial,
analysis of the conditional, that this is easier said than done. What makes
the assumption of something that is functionally equivalent to the deduction theorem so attractive, is that if the standard theory of validity is
available for relevant aspects of the language within which argumentation
takes place, the clarity of standard notions of validity enables inferences to
be assessed and formal fallacies identified.
That much is relatively obvious. Deductive validity serves as a scaffold
that structures argument by warranting the management of premise-conclusion relationships in the most general way. The theory of deductive
validity, however, has more to offer than such obvious moves. First, it
forces decisions about supporting analytic constituents. As in our earlier
discussion, it requires the analysis of the analytical relations in a field, the
constellations of what, after Carnap, might be called meaning postulates,
and the nomic relations that govern inferences by offering "inference
tickets".53 These, latter, in the physical sciences, include differential
equations (physical laws), chemical formulas, theories of measurement and
the like, including applications of the mathematical theory of probability.
The meaning postulates and inferential apparatus extends the a priori
mathematical theories so that substantive and contingent claims about the
domain can be seen as logical consequences of theories and generalizations, under appropriate substitutions and acceptable operations. These
govern the substance of deductions in the field, extending the purely
logical framework, so that scientifically relevant conclusions can be
derived. This complex of deductive apparatus, warranting both the overall
structure and crucial particulars in argumentation, is sufficiently central to
the identification and assessment of claims that it justifies the meta-logical
claim that sees deductive validity as an essential criterialogical consideration. But there is even more application for the notion of deductive
validity in scientific argumentation.
The role of deductive criteria as a scaffolding which structures argu-
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ment by warranting the management of premises, can be theoretically
motivated in light of the truth preserving property of deductive relations.
Truth preservation affords both demonstrations of the truth of conclusions
relative to the assumption that premises are true, and offers a test of the
falsity of premises. This yield, however, has not satisfied philosophers of
science. The relevance of the notion of validity has been questioned on
two counts. First, it is been argued that analyses of explanation and
reduction in terms of valid consequence relations have led to counterintuitive instances, through the promiscuous use of the rich variety of
transformations available within the theory of first order logic. 54 As crucial
have been the claims that scientific theories, even where mathematical,
furnish many examples of appropriate, although not formally valid, derivations. This is most apparent when approximations are "deduced" from
theories, that is where conclusions are closely identifiable with, but not
identical to, formally valid conclusions derived from explanatory premises. 55 But the notion of validity based on truth preservation does not
exhaust the relevance of deductive connections in the sciences. To see this
it must be realized that truth is not the only property conserved under
deductive relations. The key notion for validity is the model theoretic
analysis that shows that models are transmitted under deductive relations,
so that if p implies q then for any model M of p, M is a model of q as
well.
This to me is the more useful notion, for as I cannot argue here in any
detail, it seems to me that the core explanatory notion in science is the
transfer of theoretic models as possible interpretations of the phenomena
in a domain.5 6 This subject has exercized formalist philosophers of science
in the last decade, and although the last word is not in, it seems to me
apparent that much of the strength of theoretic explanations (and the
relevance of warrants in Toulmin's sense) is derived from their ability to
furnish unified models (interpretations) of data based on the hereditary
property of deductive relations in respect of models. The reason that
deductive validity is crucial in science is, to me, a result of the basic model
theoretic result just cited, since it justifies theorists in unifying diverse
aspects of empirical phemonena by showing how they can be rationally
explained on the supposition that the phemonena represented by the data
brought forward are models of the theoretic postulates the science proposed. Model relations, unlike truth relations, permit of clear and definable approximations and thus can capture the various demands that grow
out of scientific practice.5 7 Thus, the notion of deductive validity retains a
central role in science, both as to the management of argument, and as to
the micro-structure of explanatory and inter-theoretic relations. This must,
however, be distinguished from the more general notion of acceptability
that the body of the paper has been attempting to analyze in terms of the
pragma-dialectical analysis of scientific argument based on the accepta-
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bility and relevance of arguments within fields. But most important to our
concerns, the discussion of validity shows that, even here, the field within
which argumentation is offered is relevant to assessment. For it is only by
exploring standards in the field that appropriate model relations, and the
concomitant weakening of model relations to support acceptable approximations, can be ascertained.

5. SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT AND ARGUMENT THEORY

As philosophers of science have increasingly maintained, the history and
current practice of science is relevant to epistemology and in fact is a rich
source from which epistemological principles are to be drawn. This is, of
course, similar to the complex relation between the empirical estate and
the theoretical estate in argument theory. The empirical estate is seen
through the theoretical, but the empirical estate offers a basis for the
process of discovering aspects of the theoretical estate, and also serves to
validate the theoretical by appeal to the availability of appropriate empirical analyses. 58 This paper has attempted to support such a point of view
by showing the apparent relevance of scientific practice to central aspects
of the theory of argument as applied to stylized arguments in the sciences.
It has offered discussions of issues of relevance and authority in the
opening and confrontations stage of argumentation, and causal argument
and validity in the argumentation stage, in order to support the relevance
of the differentiated notions of these core concepts, appropriate to
scientific practice.
Discipline-specific considerations are relevant to concluding stage as
well. The analysis presented applies to consideration relevant to the
assignment of the burden of proof. I maintain that burden of proof, like
the other aspects discussed, is essentially related to the framework of the
field within which argumentation takes place. The beginnings of an
account is as follows: The burden of proof, once an initial challenge has
been made, is dependent upon whose claims, the protagonist's or the
antagonist's, deviates most from the prevailing standards. After the directive by the antagonist that the protagonist provide argumentation, the
burden is placed on whomever makes claims contra to the existing system
of methodological and substantive generalizations. But that is to say that
burden of proof can not be abstractly assigned once argumentation has
begun. Rather, that burden of proof is determined by the specific moves in
argumentation, in relation to the field within which they occur. Each party
must support, by argument, whatever claims and challenges are seen as
controversial in relation to the background that they share as members of
a discipline and discourse community. Naturally, if claims and challenges
are fundamental, extra-field considerations apply. These, however, serve
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to enlarge the implicit community of discussants, but does not weaken the
general principle that weaker or more deviant claims require support.
The upshot of this position is that burden of proof considerations
require specific content from the field. That is to say, that burden of proof
is, once argumentation has commenced, field dependent. The framework
of the field constitutes a "default parameter". If a position contra to the
field is not decisively proved, it is considered, relative to argumentation
so far, to be refuted. This reflects the conservatism already identified in
the confrontation stage of argument. And once again, such conservatism
can be supported on epistemological grounds, if it can be shown that
stability is more productive of scientific progress than change. That is not
to say that revolutions do not occur. But it is to say that revolutionary
positions must prove themselves to be equal or superior to framework
practices, if they are to be seriously considered. That is, the burden of
proof is always on him who proposes something inconsistent with prevailing standards.
This brings us to the concluding stage of argumentation. When is an
argument relevantly concluded? The argument is decided for the protagonist, if his view can be supported by considerations acceptable in the
framework, or where sufficient arguments of an intertheoretic nature
(including arguments that use philosophical considerations imported into
the scientific domain) have been put forward in support of deviations from
principles commonly accepted in the field. If the protaganist can do
neither of these, the decision is to the antagonist. This applies both to
considerations of the relevance and of the facticity of data as elaborated
above. It applies not only if the data is empirical, but also if the "data" are
abstractions drawn from historical practice, methodological canons or
philosophical speculation. Discussion in the history of ideas have their
own "data", their own generalizations and methodological assumptions.
Grounds are identified relative to the claim made, and may be at all levels
of abstraction. Warrants and backing reflect the level of abstraction of the
grounds by supporting them through argument, that at the most abstract
level, must range far and wide across the domain of human understanding.

6. CONCLUSION

In the foregoing I have been attempting to furnish the beginnings of an
account of argumentation in science that high-lights concerns not adequately captured in recent discussions of argument. In particular, I have
attempted to show how a complex model that includes Toulmin's functional account of argument, the stage analysis of argumentation offered by
the Amsterdam School, and the notion of criteria as developed within
critical thinking theory, exposes the hidden epistemological core of aspects
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of the sociology of knowledge within stylized argumentation in the
sciences. Further, the paper, through its use of examples, points away from
the sufficiency of abstract accounts of argument analysis and assessment
and offers instead the view that abstract analyses need to be strengthened
through a sense of how the families of concerns, univocally analyzed in
typical informal logic accounts, need to be differentiated by taking into
account the diversity of practice across many fields. I also include comments on the notion of validity in order to point up the centrality of
deduction to a number of aspects of argumentation, and to distinguish a
number of roles that validity plays in argument assessment.
If I am correct in my intuition, informal logicians and argumentation
theorists need to increase both the scope of their concerns, the apparatus
that they use, and exhibit a greater sensitivity to the particulars of practice
in the special disciplines. More attention should be paid to stylized
argumentation in various domains of inquiry, with particular emphasis on
the sciences, whose theoretic richness and pragmatic effectiveness makes
them, justifiably, among the most respected of human practices. A paper
of this sort, offering a broad set of concerns and using examples in an
essential way, does not furnish conclusive proof of its thesis. Rather, it
attempts to shift both the focus of the debate and the burden of proof, by
presenting convincing examples of what can be done and what needs to be
explored further. It is my hope that this will prompt further speculation
along the lines offered, and especially, result in a reevaluation of the
salient work of Stephen Toulmin.

NOTES
' I use the terms "normative" and "sociological" in what I take to be standard ways. By
"normative" I intend considerations that are epistemological in the sense that they express
norms of justification; by "sociological" I intend considerations of the social and institutional structure of science that could be described in an adequate account of actual
scientific practices. The issues that I raise in the paper speak both to the relation between
the two and the tendency to see the latter as somehow arbitrary and dependent on
contingencies of historical and cultural development. What I want to maintain is that
sociological aspects of science are not irrelevant to normative concerns, especially in the
sense that social and professional institutions develop, in science, in order to further the
justifiability of practices. That is, social and professional structures have, in part, a normative core whose function is to help insure the well-management of scientific attempts to
furnish justifiable knowledge of the world.
2 See Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983) for the stage theory of argument; Toulmin
(1958) and Toulmin et al. (1979) for the functional model.
3 Eemeren etal. (1987).
4 Eemeren et al. (1987), p. 200.
5 It is interesting to note that the criticism of Toulmin's work by Ralph Johnson (1981)
and by Eemeren et al. (1987) is primarily based on the ambiguity of the model when
applied to fragments of arguments within the context of undergraduate instruction. This is,
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despite the fact that such ambiguity is common to most, if not all, informal logic textbooks, given their tendency to use fragmented examples of argumentation taken out of
context, for pedagogical efficiency. It would be interesting to see whether Toulmin's book
fares worse in comparison with those of others. When I taught Kahane's textbook, Logic
and Contemporary Rhetoric (Kahane, 1980), just to give an anecdotal example, my
students were taught to think of possible alternative analysis for all of his examples and
exercises. This proved to be no problem even for beginning students, once we distinguished what Kahane's "right answer" was from other equally plausible analyses. Students
could find many different fallacies applicable, or even show the sample argument to be
supportable, if they were free to develop alternative contexts for the short discourse
samples presented (Weinstein, 1982). Needless to say, this a controversial account and
speaks to deep professional issues as to how and where argumentation should be taught in
the university. For if my intuition is correct, argumentation must be taught with full
appreciation of the particulars of disciplinary practice. This, of course, is unhappy news for
those among us who want argumentation, or informal logic to be essentially self-contained.
6 Manicas (1966) and Trent (1968).
7 The issue of the relation of scientific arguments to those of ordinary life has relevance to
the claim in the Handbook that Toulmin's analysis is not applicable to simple argumentation, but is rather, relevant to compound arguments alone (van Eemeren et al., 1987, p.
204). It should be noted, if only in passing, that this raises difficulties for the claim in
Speech Acts in Argumentative Discourse, that complex arguments are composed of simple
ones (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1983, pp. 91-2). For if compound arguments
require elements not found in simple ones, the reduction of complex arguments to a set of
simple ones is not possible without significant additions. This implies that complex
arguments of the sort that are common in science are not reducible to simple arguments, if
in fact scientific argument meaningfully employs functional elements of the sort identified
by Toulmin as warrants and backing.
There are two issues involved in the relationship between ordinary and scientific
arguments. First, are analogues to warrants and backing employed in, at least some,
ordinary arguments. Second, are warrants and backing of the various kinds employed in
scientific argumentation relevant to ordinary argument as well. Relevant to the first issue is
the range of considerations involved with the identification of missing premises and
unstated assumptions. For Toulmin's analysis to apply, what needs to be shown is that such
assumptions, whether construed as premises or as inferential or methodological principles,
serve functions analagous to warrants and backing. If such aspects are crucial to a range of
ordinary arguments, the relevance of functional elements in Toulmin's sense will be
supported. As an example let us briefly look at the role of backing in issues of the first sort,
that is, the role of deep rooted methodological and epistemological concerns (analogues of
backing) in ordinary argumentation. (I have dealt with the second issue in Weinstein
(1989a) where I try to show the obvious utility of scientific arguments in ordinary discussion.)
What seems apparent to me, is that enormously important aspects of ordinary argumentation can be made comprehensible if thought of as backing. So, for example, recent
work in cognitive psychology has pointed to the use of characteristic inductive policies, far
different from the logical norms of statistical or probabilistic arguments. (See, Nisbett and
Ross (1980), for a review of the literature.) For another example, research in cognitive
psychology shows that even such a fundamental inferential procedure as drawing generalizations from first-hand evidence exhibit a peculiar but describable array of inferential
strategies that are parasitic upon schema that transcend the minimal analytic structures
identified by informal logicians. (See Weinstein (1989c) for a "logical" case study of race
prejudice.)
The social psychology of cognition also points to aspects of the control of argumentation that move us into social theory. The role of social conventions and other normative
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structures in determining discourse frames and acceptable argumentation within them,
has a clear affinity to the regularized structures that determine the backing of scientific
argument. Argumentation theorists, generally speaking, construe the latter on the model of
the former, that is ordinary argumentation is taken as theoretically primitive, scientific
arguments, presumably, are to be analyzed in terms of the structures identified in the
ordinary case. Perhaps the reverse would be more enlightening. That is, the tacit hierarchical norms in ordinary argumentation might be better understood, if the paradigm upon
which their theoretic analysis was constructed more adequately reflected the more clearly
articulated function of hierarchies of authority within the disciplines. It is a contention of
this paper that if sociological norms in scientific argument are themselves grounded in
legitimate epistemological concerns, the tacit hierarchies of ordinary discourse, seen on the
model of scientific discourse, might be more open to objective evaluation and tend less to
the relativism than is characteristic of argument theory when based on sociological considerations. This is certainly something that informal logicians and argumentation theorists
should applaud. It opens the door for a more useful collaboration between sociologists,
social psychologists, informal logicians and argumentation theorists, and offers the possibility of a more adequate account of such apparently sociological concerns of argument
theory as appeal to authority.
Toulmin and Goodfield (1961, 1963, 1965).
9 I take Toulmin's theory of reason to be offered in Toulmin (1972), his initial version of
the theory of argument in Toulmin (1958). His debt to jurisprudence is acknowledged in
Toulmin et al. (1979)
'O Weinstein (1989b).
l It has been pointed out to me by Erik Viskil and Peter Houtlosser that in the standard
account of the pragma-dialectical theory the "antagonist does not assert", but rather is only
allowed to put forward "commisives of doubt" and the "directive of a request for argumentation". There are two problems with the limitation. First, commisives of doubt have an
assertive core, as do the directives in question, even if at one remove. Although their
assertive force may be hidden under their other illocutionary potential, commisives of
doubt imply the assertion of the denial of the claim denied at an appropriate level of
modality. Directives that request argumentation, presuppose the asserted denial and thus
imply its assertion as well. Second, as Viskil and Houtlosser point out, limiting assertives to
the protagonist settles the issue of burden of proof; the burden of proof is on the
protagonist. This seems unhelpful to me in scientific argument, where, as I shall maintain,
background conditions play an essential role in assigning burden of proof. Background
conditions weigh as heavily on the antagonist as on the protagonist. In complex scientific
exchanges both parties must answer to the accepted body of fact and method in the field as
represented by journal editors, referees and members of the field who will assess the
relevance and facticity of the argumentation as it progresses. Thus, the burden of proof
shifts as claims and counterclaims are evaluated in light of accepted practice in the field.
12 The notion of domains is justifiably viewed with suspicion. The discussion surrounding
P. H. Hirst's attempt to characterize particular "forms of knowledge" (Hirst, 1965), points
to the difficulty of rigorously distinguishing the components of human understanding
(Phillips, 1971). If I were to hazard an account of the notion of domain, I would take
domains to be individuated as a weighted function of subject matter and methodology
(weighted differently in different cases). This makes life difficult since, for example, some
areas of psychology will be closer to quantitative sociology than they are to other areas of
psychological inquiry. These latter seem closer to literary analysis than they are to
psychological inquiry in the behaviorist and experimentalist tradition.
My view has consequences for a number of aspects of argument assessment in science.
It requires that that scientific claims be seen as occurring within, what I have come to call,
"a nexus of justification and application" (Weinstein, 1989b). On such a view, particular
disciplines need to be understood in terms of the range of considerations that support
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those aspects of their practice that are of epistemological significance. Frequently, such
considerations are methodological and metaphysical, as frequently they involve historical
and social concerns, and almost always they involve consideration of the needs of utility
and understanding.
The range of such considerations are varied within the various academic disciplines. So,
for example, psychologists work within practices that reflect a wide range of methodological and metaphysical assumptions; the practice of physical chemists seems to include just
one. But all disciplines can be seen as including an implicit or explicit account of why their
procedures are deemed best and how their procedures appeal to the concerns of humans,
whether historical and contemporary.
This raises a fundamental issue: How to make a case for the relevance of disciplines as
domains of understanding? I rely heavily on examples. There are two problems in arguing
through examples. The first is the Plato-like demand for general descriptors. I prefer the
Wittgensteinien mode. A general argument is subject to a philosophical analysis in terms of
necessity and sufficiency. This, I maintain, obscures more than it illuminates. Rather than
necessity or sufficiency, I prefer a salient common core of similarities and differences, an
interesting "family resemblance." The second problem arises from the realization that
examples do not furnish conclusive proof, since apparent difference does not guarantee
essential difference. But if the examples are pointed and persuasive, this may shift the
burden of proof. The examples I offer are intended to, among other things, do just this,
that is, shift the burden onto those who would disregard apparently crucial differences in
the name of continuities. General and subject-neutral considerations must, in any case,
prove to be at least as illuminating as the differences among the various practices represented in a variety of fields and lead to a better understanding of inquiry. Whether general
or particular aspects prove more enlightening, of course, must remain to be seen.
Here are the sorts of examples, in question form, that lead me to claim the discipline
specificity of key epistemological concepts central for the warranting of scientific arguments: How is the adequacy of a causal account assessed in literature as opposed to
chemistry? What counts as an adequate observation of say, DNA through an electron
microscope as opposed to an observation by a historian. What standards of rigor are
required in laying out first principles, a geometer's or an economist's. Whose standards for
deduction apply to the arguments of a mathematical physicist, as opposed to those of an
economist? How do inductions differ in a domain the studies uniform natural kinds, e.g.,
geology, from induction in a domain such as social psychology? How is statistics employed
in quantum mechanics as opposed to population genetics, as opposed to educational
psychology? (They all satisfy the axioms of probability, but how far does that take is in
offering a basis for the assessment of practice?) How does narrative support analysis in
literature, as opposed to case-study analysis in the social sciences, as opposed to essays in
philosophy. And how do such narratives contrast with technical papers in an engineering
science, or research reports in quantitative social science, or molecular biology or mathematics.
What is the point of these examples? People receive, present, analyze and assess
information in widely different ways. And these ways are relevant to our understanding
and assessing arguments put forward in various domains. The assessment of arguments, for
which topic-neutral accounts of the sort common in informal logic are put forward, must
not obscure the fact that claims are based on grounds that rest on warrants which, in turn
are backed by the historical dialectic reflected in the methodology of the various fields.
Information must be seen so that its relevance to the domain of its application is apparent,
and the goodness of fit, as well as strategies for adjustment, between principles and
application is identifiable for evaluation.
One last word. I have no quarrel with a view such as that put forward by critical
thinking theorist Richard Paul when he asserts, that the world, as well as our conceptual
schemes "can be classified in indefinitely many ways" (Paul, 1985, p. 40). Rather, I would
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claim that there are classifications of the world and of the domains that are optimal for
both critical thinking and informal logic conceived of as applied epistemology. One
consequence of my view is that informal logicians and critical thinking advocates should
begin paying more attention to what such a task requires (Weinstein, 1989a; Weinstein and
Oxman-Michelli, 1989).
3 Eemeren (1988) and Eemeren and Grootendorst (1988).
'4 Naturally, similar conditions apply to the antagonist, and even to the individuals who
participate in the argumentation in a less direct way, for example, journal editors and their
chosen referees. This broadening of the scope of argumentation to include indirect
participants seems to me to be one of the ways that stylized argumentation seems to differ
from argumentation in ordinary life. Although, if my suspicions are correct, individuals
whose tacit or overt participation plays a function in the background of explicit argumentation between protagonists and antagonists, may be found to play a vital role in ordinary
argumentation as well.
2
5 Eemeren and Grootendorst (1988), p. .
16 Op. cit., p.3.

It seems to me that the sorts of concerns I address here are clearly analogous to third
order conditions, although Viskil and Houtlosser disagree on the grounds that third order
conditions are external in the sense that they do not include "circumstances the discussant
can reasonably be expected to control". I accept their limitation and intend phrases such as
"bona fide member of a field" to refer to just such socially constituted aspects of the
situatedness of the protagonist. These, of course, are to be distinguished from second order
conditions that speak to the competencies and attitudes of the protagonist himself.
1 Gould (1981).
'9 This is the first of a number of senses I will claim constitute the central notion of
relevance. I do not offer an univocal analysis of relevance, for I feel that it like other
central concepts in argumentation and informal logic, name a family of related but distinguishable notions. This is a central thrust of my enterprise here.
21 Eemeren and Grootendorst (forthcoming, pp. 41ff.) extend their account of argumentation to include "recognizability conditions" defined as "conditions which have to be fulfilled
for an utterance to be counted for the listener or reader as a particular communicative
speech act". The analogy between this concept and the issues raised in the text is readily
seen if we think of argumentational moves in science as being mediated by socially
constituted expectations. Thus, for a scientist to advance a claim to be seriously considered
both he and the claim must satisfy the expectations of those in his field that are to take his
argument as a significant move in their field.
2" My remarks should not be taken to imply a claim that the opening and confrontation
stages are generally distinct prior to analysis, or that there is a fixed sequence with which
these stages occur in ordinary argument. Rather, it is an attempt to highlight how the
context of argument functions as the framework within which issues of the opening stage of
argumentation are resolved in scientific argumentation.
22 Johnson (1981); Eemeren etal. (1987).
23 Freeman (1985).
24 Eemeren etal. (1987).
25 The same point can be made for backing: the backing of the warrants of the grounds for
claims and the backing of the warrants for the grounds themselves.
26 As reported in Newsweek, May 8, 1988.
27 See below, Section 4.
17

2'

Cartwright (1981).

MacKay, R. S. and Meiss, J. D. (1987).
Eemeren et al. (1987), p. 2 0 5 .
3
For classic accounts of reduction, see Hempel and Oppenheim (1948); see Hesse
(1961) for a classic account of analogies in science.
2

3'
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Toulmin(1975).

Feyerabend (1975).
34 See Weinstein (1989a) for an additional defense of my views. See McPeck (1989) for a

carefully constructed argument to the same purpose, dealing with the limits to the available
analysis and use of standard fallacies.
35 Lipman (1988).
36 Siegel (1988).
37 Ennis (1987).
38 Paul et al. (1989).
39 See N. 12, above, for my attempt to justify my use of examples.
4( The traditional causal fallacy, post hoc, ergo procter hoc, can be construed either as
extremely vague, and ambiguously addressing causal arguments in general, or as an extremely narrow account of Humean causation, addressing issues of, to use Hume's term,
"continguity." Hume himself distinguishes resemblance from contiguity in his analysis of
the pre-causal epistemological mechanisms for connecting ideas (Hume, 1787/1955). This
opens the door for similarity to be a relevant feature of causal claims, echoing the more
sophisticated notion of natural kinds. But there is more to causation than contiguity and
resemblance. What I will attempt to show by the discussion in the text, is the diversity of
the family of notions of causation in use in the sciences, thereby pointing to the shallowness of standard informal logic accounts.
As will be evident from the body of the text immediately following, I am more
interested in scientific examples of causal arguments than in philosophical accounts. I do,
however, believe that philosophical accounts, as well as scientific practice, reflect a family
of types rather than an univocal analysis. Against this, it might be charged that I have
assumed a particular account of causation, in that Toulmin's analysis is no more than one
version of a covering law model. (For the classic development of the covering law model
see Hempel, 1965.) Such a criticism is implicit in the review of Toulmin's work by Manicus
(1966), who sees Toulmin as offering a disguised syllogistic model of inference. Clearly,
Toulmin's account has more affinity to a covering law model than to, for example, Humean
causation. Toulmin's approach, so it seems to me, is not open to the charges leveled against
covering law models, since the dialectical core of his position is far removed from formalist
models such as Hempel's, which attempt to furnish necessary and sufficient conditions for
causation in terms of restricted or expanded entailment relations expressed in first-order
logic. (See Eberle et al. (1961) for the sort of argumentation that characterized this
tradition.) Toulmin's continuing concern with pragmatics and the history of actual argumentation removes him from the arena of such disputes. The issue is not whether
Toulmin's structural account has affinities to the covering law model, but rather, how the
inclusion of functional relations, grounds, warrants and backing, affords a level of understanding absent in other analyses of scientific argument. There seem to be a number of
reasons to see the contribution of the functional aspects of Toulmin's account as a
significant contribution. This paper is an attempt to begin to explore these reasons (see
also, Weinstein, 1989a). I see Toulmin's model, enriched with the stage analysis of
argument developed at Amsterdam, and including the work at the Institute for Critical
Thinking based on Lipman's notion of criteria (Lipman, 1988), as furnishing a tool that is
more powerful than any used so far. Naturally, only time will tell if I am correct. But now,
a word about the analysis of causation available within informal logic and critical thinking.
Causation as reconstructed in informal logic and critical thinking texts seems to me to
offer none of the richness of the use of causal arguments in science. Accounts offered are
generally narrow in their application, and so abstract as to be barely applicable to the wide
range of cases that characterize causal argumentation. Let us look at a few influential text
book accounts.
Robert Swartz and David Perkins (1989), in an extremely useful book that speaks to
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teachers at all educational levels offer a "Map of Causal Explanation". It consists of four
questions that are intended to direct inquiry: "1. What are the possible causes of the event
in question? 2. What could you find that would count for and against the likelihood of
these possibilities? 3. What evidence do you already have, or have you gathered that is
relevant to determining the cause? 4. What possibility is rendered most likely, based on the
evidence?" (p. 77). What is clear to me is that it is, in general, impossible to answer these
questions without substantive knowledge from the domains within which a given causal
explanation is offered. By "substantive knowledge" I don't only mean "facts", but principles
that determine what sort of weight is to be assigned to the considerations that support a
given causal claim, as well as principles that support the strength and reliability of the
assignment of weights themselves.
Kahane (1979) offers a similarly schematic account that raises similar issues. For the
fallacy of Questionable Cause, he offers the following: A charge of questionable cause is
warranted, "if we label a given thing as the cause of something else on the basis of insufficient or inappropriate evidence". Again one feels the need to touch methodological
ground. By what criteria are kinds of evidence deemed insufficient or inappropriate? Is
there a general account of such criteria? And if not, where but into the disciplines are we
to go for our answer? And so it seems that it is only within the various domains that the
relevant alternatives can be identified, their adequacy relevantly assessed and judgments of
insufficiency and inappropriateness made.
It is reasonable to complain that the open-textured examples of analyses of causation
just offered, unfairly represent the analyses available in the current literature. Kahane, who
I cite, spends only two pages on the causal fallacy, whereas Johnson and Blair (1983)
spend ten, and Govier (1985) spends, perhaps, as many as four of her chapters on factors
relevant to causal claims. These authors offer rich and complex argument types, patterns
and distinctions for their students to consider. But we may ask: What characteristic limits
do these analyses and examples include? Are they, for example, relevant across the
disciplines students learn within the courses they take in their undergraduate education,
courses that represent a range of scientific inquiry.
Johnson and Blair, as is their practice, draw examples from complex causal issues in
daily life. Two questions arise: first, can the structures they identify illuminate issues within
the disciplines, and second, can issues of the type they present be adequately assessed
without disciplinary knowledge, at an appropriate level of sophistication. Further, are
ordinary arguments, themselves, adequately assessed without the application of specialized
knowledge from relevant domains. (See Weinstein (1989a), where I attempt to show that a
light-hearted example offered by Perry Weddle, selecting toilet paper, is potentially rich as
an indicator of the need for specialized knowledge.)
Govier's text is strong on causal arguments. The chapter in which she deals specifically
with causal issues connects them to "social life", and so her examples include social science
issues, when they do not reflect "daily life". This, to me, is a step in the right direction; her
terminology reflects central issues in the domain she explores, e.g., correlation, and the
questions her exercises and examples reflect, involve social knowledge at a degree of
sophistication that is rightly required of college undergraduates. Her choice of topic is,
however, telling. First, she chooses one topic, social life, among many relevant to causal
analysis; second, she chooses a topic that is rich in its relevance to many ordinary
concerns, and is thereby likely to activate students' prior knowledge and prompt additional
research. This raises two questions: First, how much knowledge of facts, of appropriate
theories and of method, above and beyond the informal logic structures she provides, is
smuggled into a classroom discussion or homework assignment that would be adequate to
the phenomena presented for analysis and assessment? Second, would similar excercises
from the wide range of areas students study in college, be as available to their untutored
analysis? To what extent do critical thinking outcomes require that informal logic be a
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mere beginning to a process that must continue throughout many, if not all, of the courses
students take. And if such an outcome is required, what is the role that critical thinking
advocates and informal logicians must play in moving towards adequate and useful
accounts across the curriculum. (See Weinstein, 1989b for further discussion of these
issues; see also, Weinstein and Oxman-Michelli, 1989.)
41 See Pap (1958) for a characteristic, if extreme, view on the irrelevance of causality to
science.
42 Hempel (1965).
43

Copi (1968).

For an example of the contemporary debate, see Tooley (1987).
See, Nagel (1961) for the classic presentation.
46 Notice that explanations in chemistry do not "reduce" to those in physics in any sense
relevant for much of argumentation in the field. It is the rare chemical paper that relies on
quantum mechanical arguments. Weathermen, and others interested in the macro-properties of gases, would be foolish to use the reduced Boyle-Charles Law in its full statistical
splendor.
47 Hempel (1966).
48 Goldstein and Goldstein (1984).
4'
Carnap (1956).
5" But see Hitchcock (1987), for an attempt at utilizing deductive apparatus for a related
purpose.
s5 Even though non-deductive relations support different configurations of premise and
conclusion, they prescribe certain patterns and proscribe others. So inductive arguments
permit detachment of the antecedent and conductive arguments permit non-analytic
relations between terms. Nevertheless, both support conditionalization in the sense that,
although the internal structure of premise conclusion relations may be distinct, the minimal
conditional yields a deductively valid argument, and so the management of premises using
the standard deductive apparatus is still an issue (See N. 52, below). With strong inductive
relations, such as Baysian or other axiomatic treatments of probability, the analogy with
deductive relations is even more apparent.
52 By the minimal conditional I mean a sentence of the from "If p, and ... and p,,, then q"
which is constructed parasitic upon an argument with premises p, through p,, and conclusion q. This has an obvious, although perhaps misleading, structural analogy with the
Deduction Theorem which can be stated as: If p, .. , p,, - q then -- p, and ... and
p,, > q.
53 Carnap (1956); for "inference ticket" see Toulmin (1953).
54 See Eberle et al. (1969) for a classic instance.
55 Feyerabend (1961).
56 Weinstein (1976).
57 See, Apostel (1961) for an early attempt that, unfortunately was not, to my knowledge,
developed further.
5'
My view has immediate consequences for the relationship between argument in science
and ordinary argument, as well as implications for argumentation theory, critical thinking
and informal logic in educational settings. I maintain that ordinary argument, in all estates
including the practical, should be more carefully constructed based upon scientific practices. That is, if it is accepted that science is paradigmatic of knowledge of the most reliable
sort, and of argumentation at the highest levels that humans have achieved. This is
controversial, but it has implications for current work in the field. For example, Tony
Blair's (Blair, 1987) recent effort to give an account of premise acceptability might be
more palatable to members of the informal logic community, if science was the prototype
for argumentation. But the cost is enormous, for with science as a model, the role of
disciplinary constructions of knowledge and of field dependence becomes central, and
educational efforts to develop students' competence in argument analysis and assessment
44
45
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must include an effort that embraces the entire range of instruction. (Weinstein, 1989b;
Weinstein and Oxman-Michelli, 1989.) This has been resisted by the community of
scholars interested in ordinary argumentation, and is typified by, what seems to me, to be
an unfortunate and precipitous rejection of Toulmin's work.
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